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2 |Why is it needed and how can it be implemented? 
Executive Summary 
This Policy Brief provides a first overview of the 
state of ADAM research that was discussed during 
the first ADAM-CEPS seminar on 12 October 2007. 
It brought together academic experts, policy-makers 
and the civil society to discuss adaptation issues and 
(preliminary) ADAM research results.  
The ADAM (Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies: 
Supporting European Climate Policy – 
www.adamproject.eu) project is supported by DG 
Research of the European Commission. Its core 
objective is to acquire a better understanding of the 
costs and benefits, trade-offs, synergies and 
conflicts of adaptation and mitigation policies. 
ADAM will support EU policy development in the 
next stage of the climate change negotiations and 
inform the emergence of new adaptation and 
mitigation strategies in Europe. 
We first set out the rationale for public policy 
related to adaptation to the impacts of climatic 
change in the EU. Starting from the premise that the 
‘problem structure’ of adaptation is significantly 
different to that of mitigation, it identifies seven 
objectives for public policy action: to inform the 
potentially vulnerable; to assist in the provision of 
disaster relief; to provide incentives for and enable 
adaptation; to mainstream climate proofing of public 
policy; to plan and regulate long-term infrastructural 
assets to reduce future vulnerabilities; to regulate 
adaptation ‘spillovers’; and to compensate for the 
unequal distribution of climate impacts. A 
preliminary assessment of the adaptation Green 
Paper concludes that at least four of these seven are 
well-covered: information, knowledge and learning 
in the focus on science in the third pillar of the 
proposed strategy; early warning and disaster relief 
which is allocated to national level policy; 
mainstreaming climate-proofing in the extensive 
discussion of sectors where there is EU competence; 
and infrastructure planning. Three issues however 
are somewhat underdeveloped: facilitating 
adaptation in the market; regulating spillovers; and 
compensating for unequal distribution of climate 
impacts.  
We then briefly introduce some of the key issues 
around the concepts of adaptation policy and 
mainstreaming before elaborating our preliminary 
analysis of the stakeholder engagement process. 
Findings point to the need for flexible and robust 
adaptation policies, especially in supporting local 
action. This involves tools and methodologies for 
determining and assessing risks, identification of 
measures of ‘good’ adaptation (i.e. best-practices), 
evaluation of alternative options, adequate funding, 
the identification of linkages across sectors and 
policy areas and the importance of creating space 
for learning. Overall there appears to be a general 
consensus from within different stakeholder 
communities that a systematic approach to these 
challenges is still in its infancy and requires 
additional research and other efforts. 
The analysis on the economics of adaptation 
suggests that the economic impacts of climate 
change will be reduced by adaptation, primarily 
driven by private responses independently of 
government policy. In some cases, adaptation may 
reduce the impacts or turn climate change into an 
opportunity with a positive outcome. It also 
concludes that the principal challenges are with 
those (adaptation) needs that require collective 
action, public engagement including public finance. 
Adaptive capacity increases with both flexibility and 
economic growth and reconfirms that adaptive 
capacity is more restricted in small and remote 
communities and in the face of extreme events 
compared to centres with greater economic diversity 
and in relation to slow onset climate change. The 
potential for adaptation generally is large and may 
be fully utilised under slow and smooth changes, 
whereas this is more difficult to utilise in cases of 
climate extremes. Early, anticipatory adaptation 
may be more cost-effective than reactive adaptation. 
Looking at the economics of extreme events, there 
is growing evidence of rising economic losses due 
to extreme weather events and even today many 
regions and sectors in Europe are vulnerable to 
natural hazards. For example flood risks have risen 
and in particular the new member states experience 
high potential losses of GDP. When projecting 
weather extremes into the future, risks rise 
considerably under a business-as-usual scenario 
(supporting the argument for strong climate change 
mitigation action). Estimated probabilistic economic 
vulnerabilities in Europe suggest that governments 
may experience serious fiscal problems if extreme 
events become more frequent due to climate change. 
The final section elaborates on different concepts of 
uncertainties surrounding climate change and 
climate variability in the context of adaptation. It is 
argued that responses will depend on the range and 
type of uncertainty. However, uncertainty is not a 
good justification for postponing action since the 
uncertainty will probably only be resolved too late 
to still engage in anticipation. More importantly, 
effective adaptive measures will enable structural 
change while being sufficiently flexible to allow 
recalibration when uncertainties are reduced. How 
much flexibility to invest in needs to be resolved on 
a case-by-case basis, since it will come at very 
different costs, depending on technological and 
social constraints. 
Adaptation to Climate Change | 3 
1. Introduction1 
There is increasing recognition of the need for 
nations, communities and individuals to adapt to 
some level of climate change, irrespective of the 
level of mitigation. Adaptation is necessary to avoid 
or reduce the negative impacts and to explore any 
potential benefits of climate change. Adaptation to 
climate change will therefore have very important 
social and economic implications (as illustrated by 
the Stern Review, 2006).  
As part of the EU response, on 29 June 2007, the 
European Commission (2007a) launched its Green 
Paper on Adaptation, building on a series of ten 
thematic consultation workshops in 2006, organised 
by the second round of the European Climate 
Change Programme (ECCP-2) with the remit to 
“define the EU role in adaptation policies so as to 
integrate adaptation fully into relevant European 
policies, to identify good, cost-effective practice in 
the development of adaptation policy and to foster 
learning”.  
One of the objectives of the European Commission-
funded ADAM project (Adaptation and Mitigation 
Strategies: Supporting European Climate Policy), 
financed by the European Commission DG 
Research, is to analyse in-depth some of the issues 
arising in the Green Paper and the follow-up 
processes, notably:  
a) appraise existing and future adaptation policies 
at EU and member state level; 
b) analyse vulnerabilities to climate change for 
different sectors and regional scales;  
c) quantify the economic costs and benefits of 
adaptation to climate change;  
d) assess institutional barriers to adaptation and 
indicate possibilities to increase adaptive 
capacities; and  
e) quantify risks and costs of extreme weather 
events in the EU. 
This policy brief provides a first overview of the 
state of ADAM research as presented and discussed 
on 12 October 2007 during the first ADAM-CEPS 
seminar on adaptation. The seminar brought 
together experts from academia, policy-making, and 
the civil society to discuss adaptation issues and 
(preliminary) ADAM research results. While the 
seminar was mainly intended to disseminate ADAM 
research, the discussions with stakeholders also 
inform ADAM research and help to identify 
concrete policy questions that ADAM should 
address. As new research results become available, 
new policy briefs will be published. Since the 
                                                     
1 Contributed by Henry Neufeldt & Christian Egenhofer. 
project was only launched in March 2006, research 
results are necessarily preliminary at the current 
stage. It is expected, however, that ADAM research 
will inform the next policy round, the White Paper 
and its associated Integrated Impact Assessment. 
This policy brief is organised as follows. Following 
this Introduction, section 2 sets out the rationale for 
public policy related to adaptation to the impacts of 
climatic change in the EU. Section 3 provides 
evidence from a number of stakeholders and 
sketches the perception of various actors towards 
the role of European adaptation policies and climate 
proofing of sectoral policies. Section 4 on the 
economics of adaptation argues that the economic 
impacts of climate change will mainly be reduced 
by private autonomous response, while the principal 
challenges reside with adaptation needs that require 
collective action and public engagement, including 
public finance.  
Section 5 assesses monetary and socioeconomic 
risks from extreme weather events in Europe and 
points to the evidence of rising losses due to 
weather extremes whilst important knowledge gaps 
remain to project future risks. 
The final section (6) deals with different concepts of 
uncertainties surrounding climate change and 
climate variability, and argues for adaptive 
measures to be sufficiently flexible to allow 
recalibration as uncertainties are reduced with time. 
Box 1. Definitions  
Conceptually, a broad definition of adaptation 
commonly used is the ‘adjustment in natural or human 
systems in response to actual or expected climatic 
stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or 
exploits beneficial opportunities’ (IPCC, 2001). As our 
understanding of what adaptation actually involves has 
improved over time, it has been recognised that 
adaptation can: 1) focus on either managing the 
impacts of the climate-related hazard, reducing 
exposure to the hazard, or reducing the vulnerability of 
elements at risk (though in reality responses may 
sometimes overlap in their categorisation); 2) involve 
a range of actors throughout society from governments 
down to individuals; and 3) manifest itself in many 
forms (the Stern Review, for instance, highlighted 
differences according to whether measures were 
anticipatory or reactive, private or public, autonomous 
or planned, etc.). Recent attempts to make the concept 
operational, and hence more relevant for practitioners, 
have also found that distinguishing between process 
(building adaptive capacity) and outcome (the delivery 
of actual adaptation measures) can be useful (UKCIP, 
cited in Tompkins et al., 2005). This is an approach 
that has been adopted to help structure the ADAM 
analysis (McEvoy et al., 2007). We offer definitions of  
key terms below. 
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Adaptation: defined as adjustment in natural or 
human systems in response to actual or expected 
climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm 
or exploits beneficial opportunities. Various types of 
adaptation can be distinguished, including 
anticipatory, autonomous and planned adaptation: 
• Anticipatory adaptation – Adaptation that takes 
place before impacts of climate change are 
observed. Also referred to as proactive adaptation. 
• Autonomous adaptation – Adaptation that does 
not constitute a conscious response to climatic 
stimuli but is triggered by ecological changes in 
natural systems and by market or welfare changes 
in human systems. Also referred to as spontaneous 
adaptation. 
• Planned adaptation – Adaptation that is the 
result of a deliberate policy decision, based on an 
awareness that conditions have changed or are 
about to change and that action is required to 
return to, maintain, or achieve a desired state. 
Adaptive capacity (in relation to climate change 
impacts): often referred to as the ability of a system to 
adjust to climate change (including climate variability 
and extremes) to moderate potential damages, to take 
advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the 
consequences (IPCC, 2007). 
Vulnerability: the degree to which a system is 
susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects 
of climate change, including climate variability and 
extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, 
magnitude and rate of climate change and variation to 
which a system is exposed, its sensitivity and its 
adaptive capacity (IPCC, 2007). 
Hazard: a source of risk that does not necessarily 
imply potential for occurrence. A hazard produces risk 
only if an exposure pathway exists, and if exposures 
create the possibility of adverse consequences (EWA, 
2007). 
Mainstreaming: describes the integration of policies 
and measures to address climate change in ongoing 
sectoral and development planning and decision-
making, aimed at ensuring the sustainability of 
investments and at reducing the sensitivity of 
development activities to current and future climatic 
conditions (Klein et al., 2005). 
2. The rationale for public policy: How 
well does the EU strategy address 
the objectives for public policy?2 
The ‘problem structure’ of adaptation is 
significantly different to that of mitigation. While 
mitigation will typically have long-term effects on 
the climate – which is a global public good – many 
adaptation actions will have relatively short-term 
effects on welfare that are local and private. While 
there is a clear-cut case for government (and indeed 
                                                     
2 Contributed by Frans Berkhout.  
international governmental) action to protect public 
goods like the climate system, it is less evident that 
governments should have a role in influencing 
adaptation to climate change impacts.3 Hence, there 
is a need to define appropriate roles for public 
policy.4  
The 2007 Commission Green Paper on Adapting to 
Climate Change has started to do this. It argues for a 
multi-level approach to the governance of 
adaptation, with specific roles at the European, 
national, regional and local levels. At the European 
level the main task is to integrate (or mainstream) 
climate adaptation in policies related to vulnerable 
sectors where the EU has significant competences 
like agriculture, fisheries, water, biodiversity, health 
and transport and energy networks. The Green Paper 
also argues that adaptation needs to be integrated 
into the EU’s external policies, especially those 
oriented to more vulnerable developing countries 
through, for example, support for actions within the 
UNFCCC, such as National Adaptation Programmes 
of Action (NAPA). Support for scientific research to 
improve knowledge about climate and its impacts, 
and encouraging broader stakeholder involvement 
are also highlighted. 
2.1 Adaptation challenges for markets 
and policy  
Adaptation is defined as changes made by 
individuals, organisations and governments to 
reduce the damages (or increase the benefits) from 
climate change. But achieving efficient adaptation5 
                                                     
3 Of course, there may also be a range of private or local 
co-benefits to mitigation (including, for instance, cost 
savings or health co-benefits by switching to more 
sustainable energy), just as there can be longer-term and 
societal benefits to adaptation actions (including, for 
instance, increased resilience of regional food supplies 
through a switch to drought-resistant crops), but these 
will typically not be the primary objective of the 
mitigation or adaptation action. 
4 A variety of rationales have been given for public policy 
related to climate adaptation. Klein & Tol (1997) argue 
that public policy related to adaptation should have four 
objectives: increasing robustness of infrastructures; 
increasing flexibility and adaptability of vulnerable 
managed systems; reversing trends that increase 
vulnerability; and improving awareness and 
preparedness. 
5 IPCC (2001) argues that adaptation has three aspects: 
reducing risks of climate damages; developing capacity 
to cope with damages that are unavoidable; and being 
able to exploit new opportunities.  Adaptation is efficient 
if the costs of adaptation are smaller than the benefits in 
terms of reduced damages or increased returns 
(Mendelsohn, 2006). 
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by private actors alone turns out to be difficult due 
to a series of information, market and policy failures 
partly but not only as a result of some public goods 
characteristics, e.g. the inequitable distribution of 
climate impacts and the spillovers that adaptation 
can generate (see also sections 3 and 5). Finally, 
there are many conditions under which markets do 
not operate (such as for jointly-consumed goods like 
biodiversity), or operate only partially. In all of 
these cases government policy has a clear role. The 
literature has identified the following problems:  
• Uncertainties about climate change impacts and 
the benefits of adaptation: Uncertainty affects 
the assessment not just of climate-related 
damages, but also of the benefits of adaptation.  
• Constraints on adaptation: Much adaptation 
will draw on resources (including capital, 
knowledge, technology, consent) not held by the 
adapting agents themselves. While some of 
these resources will be available through the 
market, there are also likely to be constraints – 
partly as a result of uncertainty.  
• Role of the market in adaptation: Mendelsohn 
(2006) argues that markets will tend to 
encourage efficient adaptation in sectors whose 
goods are traded, such as agriculture, forestry, 
construction, energy and tourism. In contrast, 
markets will not be effective in encouraging 
efficient adaptation for jointly-consumed goods 
like biodiversity. Here government has a role in 
encouraging adaptation. See also section 5. 
• Adaptation spillovers: The benefits of an 
adaptation to climatic changes may not be 
exploited entirely by the agent making the 
change. There may be other beneficiaries from 
the knowledge and experience that an innovator 
has invested in. These ‘spillovers’ can lead 
systematically to a socially sub-optimal level of 
investment in adaptation, generating a rationale 
for policy and legal interventions.  
• Unequal distribution of climate change impacts: 
It is clear that the impacts of climate change will 
be unequally distributed across world regions 
and between social groups. This is partly 
because vulnerability to climate change impacts 
will to a large extent be conditioned by a host of 
other stresses related to poverty, health status 
and conflict.  
2.2 Roles for policy in adaptation 
Drawing on the insights and arguments above, we 
argue for seven objectives for public policy action: 
to inform the potentially vulnerable; to assist in the 
provision of disaster relief; to provide incentives for 
and enable adaptation; to mainstream climate-
proofing of public policy; to plan and regulate long-
term infrastructural assets to reduce future 
vulnerabilities; to regulate adaptation ‘spillovers’; 
and to compensate for the unequal distribution of 
climate impacts. 
1. Information, knowledge and learning: 
Governments have played a major role in 
sponsoring climate science and in the provision 
of tools such as global, regional and national 
climate scenarios.  
2. Early-warning and disaster relief: Most 
governments have in place plans, organisations 
and resources to alert people to weather-related 
disasters and to cope with the consequences, at 
home and abroad.  
3. Facilitating adaptation in the market: There are 
strong ‘public good’ arguments for investing in 
scientific and technological resources that may 
be widely adopted in response to climate 
change.  
4. Mainstreaming climate-proofing: Large areas of 
public policy applies to climate-vulnerable 
sectors, either because they are collective goods 
(like nature conservation) or because the state 
has a clear role through regulation or ownership 
(like water). In these sectors government will 
play part of the role in enabling or encouraging 
adaptation. 
5. Infrastructure planning and development: 
Water, transport and energy infrastructures are 
likely to be influenced by changing climate, as 
is the distribution of settlements, especially in 
coastal and fluvial flood plains. Modification of 
infrastructures and of spatial plans in response 
climate impacts is another area in which 
governments will play a major role.  
6. Regulating adaptation spillovers: Unregulated, 
it is likely that the most vulnerable social groups 
will end up bearing many of the new social and 
economic risks that arise as a result of climate 
change. 
7. Compensating for the unequal distribution of 
climate impacts: The notion of compensation is 
by now well-entrenched in public health and 
environmental policy. Where the cause of 
damage can be well-defined, compensation can 
be dealt with between individuals, but where it 
cannot be clearly established, governments need 
to play a role. 
2.3 Assessing the EU strategy 
In the ‘four pillars’ of EU adaptation policies 
identified in the 2007 Green Paper, at least four of 
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these seven are well-covered: information, 
knowledge and learning in the focus on science in 
the third pillar of the proposed strategy; early 
warning and disaster relief which is allocated to 
national level policy; mainstreaming climate-
proofing in the extensive discussion of sectors 
where there is EU competence; and infrastructure 
planning. But three of these issues play a less 
prominent role: facilitating adaptation in the market; 
regulating spillovers; and compensating for unequal 
distribution of climate impacts (although the latter is 
partially covered in the discussion of integrating 
adaptation into the EU’s external actions, pillar 2). 
3. Adaptation policies and 
mainstreaming6 
This section briefly introduces some of the key 
issues around the concepts of adaptation policy and 
mainstreaming before elaborating on preliminary 
analysis of the stakeholder engagement process.7 
Findings point to the need for flexible and robust 
adaptation policies, especially in supporting local 
action. This involves tools and methodologies for 
determining and assessing risks, identification of 
measures of ‘good’ adaptation (i.e. best-practices), 
evaluation of alternative options, adequate funding, 
the identification of linkages across sectors and 
policy areas and the importance of creating space 
for learning. Overall there appears to be a general 
consensus from within different stakeholder 
communities that a systematic approach to these 
challenges is still in its infancy and requires 
additional research and other efforts. 
3.1 Adaptation policies 
As the impacts of climate change have become more 
evident (e.g. EEA, 2006), several countries in 
Europe have started to plan for and implement 
measures to adapt to anticipated climate change and 
variability. A series of stakeholder interviews8 
across sectors have confirmed that progress on 
adaptation is still at an early stage, even though EU 
market structures are considered well developed and 
capacity to adapt is high compared to other regions 
in the world (Stern, 2006).  
                                                     
6 Contributed by  Darryn McEvoy & Paul Watkiss. 
7 McEvoy et al. (2008). 
8 Some exerpts from the ADAM stakeholder interviews 
(McEvoy et al., 2007): “Evidence of best practice is 
limited because the adaptation agenda is so new” (Town 
and Country Planning Association) and “we are currently 
in the process of moving from the development of an 
adaptation strategy to a period where we will see actual 
delivery of measures on the ground” (City of London 
Authority). 
There are a number of initiatives that address both 
impacts and adaptation in some EU member states. 
These include Finadapt9 in Finland, Klimaat voor 
Ruimte10 (climate changes spatial planning) in the 
Netherlands, and several in the United Kingdom – 
particularly the UK Climate Impacts Programme 
(UKCIP).11 UKCIP has been set up to help 
organisations and individuals assess how they might 
be affected by climate change, and to prepare for 
impacts. Practically, a number of practical tools 
have been developed including a so-called UKCIP 
adaptation wizard, a risk, uncertainty and decision-
making framework, and a specific methodology for 
costing the impacts of climate change.  
At the EU level, the profile for adaptation has 
gradually increased. First, the European 
Commission’s 2005 Communication, Winning the 
battle against climate change, set out that the 
Commission should explore “the role of the EU in 
reducing vulnerability and promoting adaptation” 
and that “EU climate policy should aim to reduce 
vulnerability of European society and economy to 
the adverse effects of climate change and improve 
its resilience”. In 2007, the European Commission 
(2007b) Communication Limiting Global Climate 
Change to 2 degrees Celsius: The way ahead for 
2020 and beyond; stated that: “Measures to assist 
countries to adapt to the unavoidable consequences 
of climate change will have to be an integral part of 
the future global climate agreement. The need to 
adapt to the impacts of climate change should be 
taken into account in public and private investment 
decisions. Building on the implementation of the EU 
Action Plan on climate change and development 
(which was to have been reviewed in 2007) the EU 
should enhance its alliance-building with 
developing countries in the areas of climate change 
adaptation and mitigation. The EU should also 
strengthen the implementation of the EU Action 
Plan on climate change in the context of 
development cooperation.” The importance of 
adaptation has also been acknowledged by the 
European Council.  
As all EU policies – not only those that are directed 
towards avoiding climate change – have a potential 
impact on adaptation by affecting vulnerability or 
the ability to adapt, it is not yet clear where the field 
“EU adaptation policy” starts and where it ends. As 
a first step, this would point to a need to identify the 
areas where EU policy competencies in general and 
law and measures in particular, can have significant 
                                                     
9 http://www.ymparisto.fi/default.asp?contentid= 
165496&lan=en  
10 http://www.klimaatvoorruimte.nl/  
11 http://www.ukcip.org.uk/  
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influence on Europe’s citizens. A greater 
understanding of interactions between different 
policies and sectors, and potential spillover effects 
will ultimately be a prerequisite for mainstreaming 
climate change considerations across all EU 
policies. 
Box 2. Adaptation to reinforce the mitigation 
agenda: an example 
As a practical example, urban greenspace benefits 
adaptation by providing valuable cooling and 
infiltration functions whilst contributing to social 
agendas, and even reinforcing the mitigation agenda 
by reducing energy use through the shading of 
buildings. These ‘win-win’ situations provide 
important opportunities for delivering adaptation, even 
if not directly motivated for this purpose. 
Alternatively, there may be policy barriers as 
illustrated by the potential conflict between mitigation 
and adaptation measures – urban densification seen as 
good for mitigation but acting against adaptation 
objectives (McEvoy et al, 2006). A better 
understanding of opportunities and barriers will 
undoubtedly assist more effective decision-making and 
the informed development of an overarching strategic 
framework at EU level. 
3.2 Mainstreaming 
In addition to the emergence of adaptation policy 
frameworks, there is a recognition that there is a 
need to consider how best to address adaptation 
objectives through existing institutional 
mechanisms. This is increasingly described as 
‘mainstreaming’. The concept was first put forward 
and explored at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (Johannesburg, 2002), and in early 
usage is most commonly associated with the 
integration of climate change considerations into 
development assistance. More recently it has been 
applied to wider policy contexts, i.e. strategies for 
adaptation needing to be embedded within existing 
horizontal and sectoral policies and institutional 
frameworks.  
Emphasis on existing policies, rather than relying on 
the design and implementation of independent 
adaptation policies results also from the cross-
cutting nature of adaptation to climate change. The 
Adaptation Green Paper highlights that ‘certain 
sectors (e.g. agriculture, water, biodiversity, 
fisheries, and energy networks) are largely 
integrated at EU level through the single market and 
common policies and it makes sense to integrate 
adaptation goals directly into them’. It also 
discusses the need to ’integrate adaptation when 
implementing and modifying existing and 
forthcoming legislation and policies’, and that 
‘when preparing their programmes for Community 
support, Member States should integrate adaptation 
activities’. There is also a further pragmatic 
consideration in that there is no single legal basis at 
the EU level for climate change actions, nor a 
dedicated budget line. Both tend to be wrapped in a 
range of existing provisions and funds. The Green 
Paper refers to the need for integration, e.g. 
discussing integration of adaptation activities in key 
sectoral policies, though critically there is little 
consideration of the mechanisms, or the proposed 
‘roadmap’, that would help to promote 
mainstreaming.12  
There are signs of progressive mainstreaming across 
a number of important sectors: 
• The European Commission is working on a 
Communication on water scarcity and droughts 
which is closely linked to climate change and 
adaptation. Likewise, the proposed legislation 
on the assessment and management of floods 
will focus on prevention, protection and 
preparedness’. 
• For the agricultural sector, the Green Paper 
outlines that community support plays an 
important role in food production, the 
maintenance of rural landscapes, and the 
provision of environmental services. There is a 
need as part of current reforms (e.g. of the 
Common Agricultural Policy - CAP) to move 
towards a framework for the sustainable 
development of EU agriculture. The Green 
Paper states that ‘future adjustments of the CAP 
and the 'Health check' of 2008 could provide 
opportunities to examine how to better integrate 
adaptation to climate change in agriculture 
support programmes. 
• In the area of energy, the Green Paper outlines 
that the Commission has a role, and is currently 
working towards a Strategic Energy Technology 
Plan, which will consider adaptation. In the 
urban context, a key energy issue is in relation 
to buildings. The Commission will start work on 
revising the relevant regulatory framework in 
the near future, in particular the Directive on 
energy performance of buildings. 
• For transport, the Green Paper outlines that 
‘new transport infrastructure and related 
transport means should be made climate proof 
from the early design phase’. 
• In relation to crosscutting themes, ‘Climate-
proofing must be integrated into the 
                                                     
12 A similar criticism can be levelled at national 
Governments, as indicated through one interviewee’s 
comments that there is ‘obviously a need for better 
coordination of response and for the Government to get 
its own house in order’ (in reference to the UK).   
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Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
Directive and the Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (SEA) Directives.  
• Again, in relation to water resources, there is a 
recognition that the Water Framework Directive 
(WFD) is a powerful tool for introducing 
climate change impacts into water resources 
management and river basin planning (see: the 
main conclusion of Time to Adapt — Climate 
Change and European Water Dimension, held as 
part of the German EU presidency’s activities). 
The concept of mainstreaming was also 
discussed in the recent EEA report (2007) 
‘Climate change and water adaptation issues’.  
• The Green Paper also acknowledges that EC 
funding programmes are an important 
component of promoting climate change 
adaptation, stating that there will be an 
examination of ‘how climate proofing can be 
reflected and made operational in the 
programmes and projects adopted under the 
Cohesion Fund, Regional Development Fund, 
pre-accession instruments, Trans-European 
Networks Programmes, and infrastructure 
measures under the Rural Development Fund’. 
Ensuring that climate change considerations are 
adequately incorporated into these important 
funding streams will be a critical constituent of 
any future EU adaptation strategy, in particular 
the White Paper on adaptation, to be published 
in 2008. 
3.3 Preliminary findings from the ‘actor-
based’ analysis: implications for the 
Green Paper 
This section draws together some of early findings, 
based on preliminary policy analysis and an initial 
round of interviews with key stakeholders across a 
variety of different sectors (as well as those 
responsible for cross-sectoral policy). Due to the 
focus of the research, the emphasis is on the 
‘process’ of adaptation, and the building of adaptive 
capacity. A number of initial findings can be 
presented. 
3.3.1 Climate risks go mainstream  
Many of the interviewees felt that they no longer 
had to deal with sceptics in the same way as in the 
past. Climate change science is more or less 
accepted now, and resistance to change is in retreat. 
It was acknowledged that there is a need to think 
differently about the management of climate risk, 
for example expressed as “change management 
rather than climate change”. Interviewees noted a 
shift in the business perspective from viewing 
climate change as an environmental risk, and thus 
marginal, to a corporate risk, central to the business 
with a similar importance to geopolitical or health 
and safety risks.  
3.3.2 Promising policy areas for EU 
mainstreaming  
A preliminary screening analysis suggests that EU 
policy has the potential to mainstream adaptation 
across most policy areas, covering most major 
sectors (see Appendix 1). The most important areas 
for mainstreaming (i.e. where the EU has important 
competencies, and the ability to influence) are 
thought to be for agriculture and water sectors. 
There are also potentially important influences in 
relation to coasts/marine systems, tourism, health, 
biodiversity, built environment and infrastructure. 
Further afield, there is also the potential to affect 
non-EU vulnerability through foreign/development 
policy and through trade, i.e. with external EU 
areas.  
3.3.3 Initial focus is on institutional capacity, 
not on adaptation measures 
For all interviewees, identification of processes was 
easier than outcomes, i.e. highlighting the important 
role that institutional capacity has to play in 
‘enabling’ future adaptation to take place. As such, 
it was noted that it would be important to 
understand how learning occurs in organisations 
(and individuals), the role of champions in 
individual organisations, and how different 
institutional structures facilitate, or hamper, 
adaptation. A common message was for 
responsibility (and possible liability) to be more 
clearly defined. It was acknowledged that the 
perception of risk and decision-making cultures of 
sectors and organisations has a strong influence on 
whether climate-related activity is likely to be 
proactive or reactive.  
3.3.4 Adaptation as a learning process 
Across all the interviews, access to the latest 
scientific knowledge and best practice, and ensuring 
responses are evidence-based, was seen as 
extremely important for organisations to adapt (the 
forthcoming ADAM adaptation catalogue was seen 
as a potentially valuable addition to the knowledge 
base by those interviewed). As such, platforms for 
knowledge transfer were seen as critical. In addition 
to having access to knowledge, a common thread 
that weaves throughout all the interviews is the 
importance of ‘learning to adapt’, and ultimately to 
better understand how learning occurs in different 
organisations (seen as a crucial component of the 
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adaptation process). Indeed, there is a lot we can 
learn from other contexts, sectors and systems on 
how to do this well (knowledge already exists in 
relation to the conditions that best support effective 
learning, e.g. a comfortable space, lack of urgency, 
etc.). Peer-to-peer learning through networks, well 
facilitated meetings, training events, etc. was seen 
by some as a good way to share practical 
information about experiences, overcoming barriers 
and detailing best practice (as well as providing 
required support for decision-makers).  
Box 3. Examples of actors’ risk perception  
Two examples of actors who see the risks of 
climate change as very real are the Greater 
London Authority and the Association of British 
Insurers. London is seen as potentially at risk 
from all the major climate-related hazards and is 
therefore pro-active in developing a 
comprehensive adaptation policy. The authority 
recognises that climate risks are likely to affect 
most aspects of business, as well as being an 
environmental issue. The insurance industry is 
also particularly pro-active (and seen as having a 
key role to play in the adaptation agenda) and is 
increasingly willing to engage with government, 
business and others, in order to more effectively 
manage climate risks. They also have 
considerable power to influence adaptation 
activity. For instance, the Association of British 
Insurers (in its role as an umbrella group for the 
insurance sector) has negotiated with the UK 
Government and committed to continue the 
provision of flood insurance, on the condition that 
investment is made to ensure adequate climate 
proofing of planned developments.  
3.3.5 Better stakeholder engagement with 
policy  
As noted in the interviews: ‘adaptation responses 
can benefit significantly from effective, and 
iterative, stakeholder engagement’. This suggests 
the need for improved interactions between the 
policy, stakeholder, and scientific communities 
(quote: in many instances policy makers are 
unaware of what is actually happening at the ‘coal-
face’, a result of liaising predominantly with other 
policy makers). Therefore, mobilising local 
experiences was viewed as a key asset for 
identifying options and relevant indicators. The 
BKCC programme (Building Knowledge for a 
Changing Climate) in the UK (and successor 
programme, Sustaining Knowledge for a Changing 
Climate) was suggested as an example of best 
practice, both in linking science, policy and 
stakeholders, and in providing practical tools for 
robust decision-making. Although there is clearly an 
increased awareness of climate change, it was also 
noted that there is a perceived gap between theory 
and practice and that converting awareness into 
practical actions is a common problem. It was 
argued that further advanced level training for 
professionals will ensure that the climate change 
information / guidance is put to most effective use 
(the importance of educating those in key positions). 
3.3.6 Costs and benefits 
Not surprisingly, the economic dimension of 
adaptation was considered very important by several 
of those interviewed. It was felt that decision-
makers need more detailed information on the costs 
and benefits of alternative adaptation measures, as 
this will be an important influence for both private 
and public investment. Existing lack of knowledge 
of the costs and benefits of adaptation options was 
seen as a potential barrier to implementation. Other 
wider economic issues were also discussed, for 
example in relation to difficulties in assigning 
values to natural resources correctly (leading to 
economic disincentives that may act against 
responses). Similarly, even though climate change 
has been identified as a major threat to society, there 
was concern that inadequate resources to fund 
adaptation activity was a major barrier (both in 
financial terms and the presence and development of 
an adequate skills base).  
3.3.7 Common themes identified by 
stakeholders 
Contributions from experts and stakeholders seem to 
suggest the following:  
• Any adaptation framework – irrespective of the 
governance level it will be set at – will need to 
incorporate tools and mechanisms that enable 
adaptation activity i.e. ensuring flexibility and 
support for local level action. As we would 
expect, and as we know from other policy areas, 
meaningful local participation can benefit the 
development of risk assessment in addition to 
promoting the legitimacy of decision-making, 
and the effective implementation of adaptation 
measures.  
• Adaptation can be considered as a process or 
outcome. If it is seen as process, education, 
information and awareness become crucial in 
building adaptive capacity. The interviews point 
to the importance that stakeholders attach to 
enhance learning via mechanisms or platforms 
that promote the transfer of knowledge between 
science, stakeholders, and policy makers. If 
adaptation is seen as output, key issues are the 
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clarification of what “good” adaptation actually 
is or should be but also how to measure it and 
evaluate different options.  
• Moving towards the implementation of 
adaptation measures, results were quite 
predictable and included the importance of 
adequate resourcing to ensure that the 
adaptation agenda is supported or the need to 
identify different possible ‘points of entry’ in 
promoting adaptation (e.g. during major policy 
reviews, or new internal or external policy 
initiatives) to avoid golden (policy) 
opportunities being missed.  
• Stakeholders confirmed that “adapting to 
climate change” requires integration across 
different policy ‘silos’ (see mainstreaming 
section). Yet, governments in general have 
difficulties in formulating and implementing 
integrated approaches. Adaptation could have 
positive implications for other policy fields such 
as social/environmental justice and improving 
quality of life. Policy makers should attempt to 
identify those areas with synergies between 
adaptation and other policies, particularly 
sustainable development.  
• A key challenge for the EU – as it is for 
governments in general – is to ensure that 
adaptation is adequately integrated into policies 
and funding regimes, recognising that this can 
impact both EU and non-EU vulnerabilities.  
• As a final point, stakeholders also identified the 
need for more innovative use of incentives and 
rebates (for example, Germany: permeable 
paving, Australia: water saving initiatives) not 
only to promote the implementation of 
adaptation measures but also the “process” 
through awareness raising and local support.  
4. The economics of adaptation13 
The analysis on the economics of adaptation 
suggests that the economic impacts of climate 
change will be reduced by adaptation, primarily 
driven by private responses autonomous of 
government policy. In some cases, adaptation may 
reduce the impacts or turn climate change into an 
opportunity with a positive final outcome. It also 
concludes that the principal challenges are with 
those (adaptation) needs that require collective 
action, public engagement including public finance. 
Adaptive capacity increases with both flexibility and 
economic growth. The preliminary analysis 
reconfirms an expected result that the adaptive 
capacity is more restricted in small and remote 
communities and in the face of extreme events 
                                                     
13 Contributed by Asbjørn Aaheim & Anita Wreford 
compared to centres with greater economic diversity 
and in relation to slow onset climate change. The 
potential for adaptation generally is large and may 
be fully utilized under slow and smooth changes, 
whereas this potential is more difficult to utilize in 
cases of sudden changes. Early, anticipatory 
adaptation may be more cost-effective than reactive 
adaptation. 
4.1 The role of economics  
The economics of adaptation has several roles. It 
can assist in achieving a given level of adaptation in 
the most cost-effective way. Under a wider analysis, 
it can be used to compare the benefits and costs of 
adaptation, to ensure that the benefits of the 
adaptation measure outweigh the costs, and can help 
prioritise alternative adaptation options. Finally, 
under a formalised cost-benefit analysis, it can be 
used to achieve the optimal level of adaptation. So 
far, the economics of adaptation is a relatively 
unexplored field of research with few results.  
The literature distinguishes between autonomous 
direct adaptation and autonomous indirect 
adaptation. Autonomous direct adaptation can be 
described as changes that market participants or 
individuals make as part of their economic 
behaviour when confronted with climate change. 
This means that a change in the climate triggers 
responses of market participants or individuals , e.g. 
to change inputs or their behaviour in order to 
continue producing the same output or satisfying the 
same needs as before the change.14 It is likely that 
direct autonomous adaptation will constitute a major 
part of the adaptation that will take place under 
climate change. The role and importance of 
autonomous direct adaptation depends critically on 
how developed the markets are. Thus, in less 
developed countries, and in particular in informal 
sectors, opportunities for autonomous direct 
adaptation are restricted, and the actors thereby 
become more vulnerable to climate change. 
                                                     
14 Examples are e.g. i) if more fertiliser is required per 
unit of land in order to produce the same crop “after” 
climate change, the farmer will consider the possibility of 
using more land or a little more of both, ii) If climate 
change is negative for crops and positive for cattle, the 
composition of the agricultural product of a country will 
become more dominated by cattle and less by crops, iii) 
More rainy days makes more people travel by car rather 
than walk or bicycle. A more humid climate will 
therefore increase the use of cars even if the transport 
needs are the same; iv) An increase in days with “extreme 
heat” has the costs of an increase in hospital admittances. 
However, the consumers, who are potential patients, will 
adapt by purchasing more cooling equipment in order to 
avoid heat stress in the future. 
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Autonomous indirect adaptation is a result of the 
market effects spurred by climate change. In other 
words, impacts of climate change in one sector have 
a knock-on effect in other sectors, affecting prices 
and therefore production. Commodities and services 
heavily dependent on the utilisation of natural 
resources will be particularly vulnerable, because 
the availability of natural resources is sensitive to 
the climate. These sectors clearly include 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries. Other sectors of 
possible interest are transport and tourism. 
Box 4. Economics of timber production  
For example, it is expected that the productivity 
of forests will increase under climate change, at 
least in the northern hemisphere. In economic 
terms, this means that the cost of supplying 
timber goes down. However, due to the global 
interactions between supply and demand, the final 
outcome to the owners of the forests is negative: 
Higher productivity in forested land implies that 
the rent collected on harvest is reduced because 
the prices go down. Those who gain are the 
consumers, who are spread all over the world, 
since timber is a world traded commodity. In 
other words, what appeared to be good news to 
forest owners became good news to the world 
consumer, while the owners ended up facing a 
loss (Aaheim et al., forthcoming). 
Neither direct nor indirect autonomous adaptation 
are subject to policy making in general. However, 
being a result of predicted behaviour among 
economic agents, possible undesirable consequences 
may need policy interventions. For example, 
adaptation requires accelerated turnover of the 
capital stock. Hence, the economic agents need 
time, perhaps decades, to adapt. The new 
investments will also be made with an additional 
source of uncertainty, namely how and to what 
extent the climate will continue to change. Thus, 
autonomous adaptation works best under a slow and 
smooth change of climate. The main challenges 
occur in cases of sudden changes. 
4.2 Adaptation under local restrictions 
In an ideally competitive market, the potential for 
autonomous adaptation is significant. Capital moves 
freely across borders and labour is mobile and it 
does not matter where services are produced or 
demanded as long as they are produced. The real 
situation is more constrained. A local community 
whose economic activities depend heavily on 
climate-dependent activities, such as tourism, will 
be more severely affected than larger communities 
where these activities constitute a small share. The 
effect of the closure of businesses, in terms of social 
costs on a small community, is much more 
significant than in a larger community, where 
customers are likely to be recruited from a larger 
variety of activities, thereby making them less 
vulnerable. Policies that generally contribute to 
more flexible economies will moreover enhance the 
adaptive capabilities. For example, education makes 
it easier to move and actually get a job and increases 
the ability to change the structure of the economy 
into a less climate dependent direction.  
4.3 Public action and implementation of 
adaptation measures  
The economics of autonomous direct adaptation 
assumes that private actors undertake adaptation 
measures to the extent that the cost they pay on the 
margin equals the expected marginal reduction of 
the damage that they themselves feel responsibility 
for. This may however not be true.  
• First, measures to protect and prevent against 
negative impacts benefits the collective without 
being subject to the control of single agents 
and/or measures are subject to economies of 
scale. Hence, there is a lack of incentives to 
single agents to implement them. An example 
for this are dikes. Cost-benefit analysis 
repeatedly shows that the benefits of dike 
building outweigh the (construction) costs, at 
least in densely populated areas that have been 
studied. Similar measures include building to 
prevent river flooding, building standards 
aiming at resisting storms, protection walls 
against land-slides etc. However, there are few, 
if any, systematic assessments of such options 
in relation to climate change.  
• Second, even if incentives for the individuals 
exist, public authorities may nevertheless take 
the responsibility, especially in the case of 
natural hazards. Damages caused by natural 
hazards in most EU member states are subject to 
combined response of different parties, usually 
justified by ethical arguments: people should 
not bear an extra burden for being exposed to 
natural hazards. As a result, however, 
individuals lose incentives to take appropriate 
actions to protect and prevent, for example 
when developing areas subject to a hazard risk. 
This creates the “moral hazard” effect, for 
example excess development in risky areas. The 
damages under climate change will therefore 
also exceed the damage that reflects the 
accepted level of security in a society. 
Finally, it should not be forgotten that there is an 
increasing role of private insurances, which will be 
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crucial to discourage exposure to risk, e.g. by not 
providing insurance to homes built in exposed areas.  
4.4 Transaction costs 
Often unaccounted for, transactions costs are made 
of up the costs associated with searching for 
information, searching for partners in collective 
action, drawing up and enforcing contracts, and 
building up networks and social capital. The most 
advanced analysis of the transaction costs of 
implementing policies designed to bring about 
public benefits have been undertaken in agriculture 
and land use. It has been shown in the agricultural 
sector that farmers failed to adopt voluntary 
conservation practices in Europe even where they 
were being paid to do so because of the perceived 
high transaction costs in setting up the contracts 
with government agencies (Falconer, 2000). Such 
policies for land use may well be part of adaptation 
to climate change and, with significant uncertainties 
about local climatic conditions and changes in 
variability, it may well be that transactions costs for 
adaptation policy implementation may be high. 
A distinction can also be made between anticipatory 
vs. reactive adaptation, i.e. adaptation that occurs 
before or after the impacts of climate change are 
observed. There can be circumstances when an 
anticipatory intervention is less costly and more 
effective than a reactive action (a typical example is 
that of flood protection). There are some studies that 
show that reactive responses are not always cost-
effective or adequate, and that the transactions costs 
associated with adaptation policy implementation 
may be high. However, it is increasingly agreed that 
in order to prevent major damages, a purely reactive 
strategy will not be sufficient (especially larger and 
more complex adaptation measures need to be 
planned in advance). This will need to be tested for 
EU member states across various sectors. ADAM 
will undertake this work in the future. 
4.5 Research gaps and policy challenges 
Little research exists specifically quantifying the 
costs and benefits of adaptation. Some studies 
attempt to address adaptation in a generic sense, for 
example PESETA, Stern, IPCC, however few 
provide comprehensive estimates of economic costs 
or benefits across sectors. Increasing sectoral 
literature is emerging, particularly on the costs of 
adaptation to sea-level rise. Considerable research 
exists in the health sector on the costs of climate 
change (e.g. Bosello et al. 2006), particularly for 
extreme events. However, the costs of adaptation 
are less well understood.  
Studies in the agricultural sector tend to assume 
either perfect autonomous adaptation or no 
adaptation at all. ADAM has identified a need for 
research to compare the costs of adaptation with the 
costs of not adapting for most if not all potentially 
affected sectors. We come back to the earlier 
assumption that efficient markets are best suited to 
facilitate adaptation actions. However, to establish 
efficient markets may be challenging, particularly in 
cases of possible sudden changes, where proper 
adaptation strategies require planning. For example, 
extreme events represent sudden changes that may 
be subject to incomplete insurance markets. The 
costs are seldom shared according to the risks of 
those exposed, with a resulting lack of incentives for 
adaptation. Policies may instead create incentives 
that encourage mal-adaptation, i.e. increasing 
vulnerability. There is a need to study alternative 
incentive structures in this area.  
Moreover, better insights into the public good 
character of adaptation measures would be helpful 
to improve the efficiency of adaptation. Public 
goods are measures for which the benefits are 
shared by many actors. Identification of public 
goods is helpful in defining cases where public 
authorities ought to develop adaptation strategies, 
and in what cases adaptation may be left to private 
actors. Generally, public good measures will be 
underfinanced if left to private intiatives. But there 
are also examples of adaptation measures initiated 
by private investors where side effects are ignored, 
thereby increasing the vulnerability of others. 
Maladaptation, i.e. “any changes in natural or 
human systems that inadvertently increase 
vulnerability to climatic stimuli” or “adaptation that 
does not succeed in reducing vulnerability, but 
increases it instead” IPCC (2001) can lead to the 
following effects (Downing et al., 2005): 
• Inefficient use of resources compared to other 
options (e.g. the principle that all actions should 
be climate-proof through adaptation would be 
an extremely expensive tax on current 
investment that is unlikely to provide good 
value for society as a whole);  
• Ineffective (e.g. relying on scenarios of future 
climatic risks that are not subsequently realised 
and actions that have no other benefits);  
• Displacing vulnerability (from one actor to 
another) and/or 
• Reducing the possibility for future adaptation. 
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5. Assessing monetary and economic 
risks from extreme weather events 
in Europe15 
There is growing evidence of rising economic losses 
due to extreme weather events and even today many 
regions and sectors in Europe are vulnerable to 
natural hazards. For example flood risks have risen 
and particularly the new Member States experience 
high potential losses of GDP. When projecting 
weather extremes into the future, risks rise 
considerably under a business-as-usual scenario 
(supporting the argument for strong climate change 
mitigation action). On the other hand there are 
important knowledge gaps, particularly concerning 
the assessment of monetary and wider 
socioeconomic risks to extreme events. ADAM 
research attempts to narrow the gap for better 
adaptation decisions by: a) mapping asset risks to 
flooding and droughts (other hazards are being 
included over time) in Europe for today and future 
climates (direct risks); and b) estimating economic 
vulnerabilities due to natural hazards for the public 
and different sectors in Europe (indirect risks). 
Estimated probabilistic economic vulnerabilities in 
Europe suggest that governments may experience 
serious fiscal problems if extreme events become 
more frequent due to climate change. 
5.1 Spatial and probabilistic assessment 
of extreme event risks 
The escalating increase in disaster losses from 
floods, droughts, and other climate-related disasters 
both in developed and developing countries has 
been a major concern over the last years. There is 
mounting evidence of a significant climate-change 
signal in natural disaster events, for example, 
increasing extreme precipitation at mid- and high-
latitudes (Schönwiese et. al, 2003), extreme floods 
and droughts in temperate and tropical Asia, severe 
dry events in the Sahel and southern Africa (IPCC, 
2007), and increases in tropical cyclone activity in 
the Atlantic and the Pacific region (Emanuel, 2005).  
In Europe, wide ranging impacts of changes in 
current climate have been documented: retreating 
glaciers, longer growing seasons, shift of species 
ranges, and health impacts, e.g. due to the 2003 heat 
wave of unprecedented magnitude causing 70,000 
premature deaths (EU DG ENV, 2007). There is a 
continuity and consistency between the observed 
changes and those projected for future climate 
change. Negative impacts will include increased risk 
of inland flash floods, and more frequent coastal 
                                                     
15 Contributed by Reinhard Mechler, Carlo Lavalle & 
Zbigniew Kundzewicz 
flooding and increased erosion (due to storms and 
sea-level rise). Furthermore, climate change is 
expected to magnify regional differences in 
Europe’s natural resources and assets. In the North, 
reduced demand for heating, less winter deaths, 
increased crop yields, longer vegetation season, 
extension of agricultural land areas, increased forest 
growth, tourism-friendly increase of the Baltic Sea 
temperature, and increasing water power are 
projected. In Southern Europe, climate change is 
projected to worsen conditions (high temperatures 
and drought) in a region already vulnerable to 
climate variability, and to reduce water availability, 
hydropower potential, and, in general, crop 
productivity. As climate change continues, negative 
impacts are likely to outweigh its benefits (IPCC, 
2007).  
Already today many regions and sectors in Europe 
are vulnerable to increasing disaster risks because of 
a lack of resources to implement cost-effective loss-
reduction and risk-transfer measures, and their 
consequent inability to recover in a timely way to 
disaster events. The number of disastrous weather 
and climate-related events in Europe per year 
doubled over the 1990s compared with the previous 
decade, while non-climatic events such as 
earthquakes remained constant. Until 2004, four of 
the five years with the largest economic losses have 
occurred since 1997 (EEA, 2004). 
Furthermore, as discussed in the green paper these 
“direct risks” will have important ripple economic 
effects (“indirect risks”) on economic sectors, such 
as agriculture and the insurance industry, as well as 
the public sector. Yet, the knowledge base on 
disaster impacts and risks is heterogeneous. As put 
forward in the fourth assessment report of the IPCC 
(2007) and the EU Adaptation Green Paper, risk 
management methods and tools are not sufficiently 
developed to adequately address this. Knowledge 
exists mainly on the risks (exposure, sensitivity and 
impacts) from sudden and slow-onset disasters from 
extreme weather.  
In ADAM one focus of the research on extremes is 
concerned with providing digital maps of risks form 
natural extremes for Europe and identifying the 
associated monetary losses. The innovation with 
respect to available maps is that they are consistent, 
probability based and spatially explicit16. For 
instance, we find that almost all of the newest EU 
Member States have a potential flood damage risk 
higher than 1% of GDP. As hazards and risks are 
                                                     
16 The maps are on a 50 × 50 km2 grid level for Europe 
and currently project monetary losses for 20, 50, and 100 
year riverine flood events and drought risks. Other 
extreme event hazards, e.g. forest fires will follow.  
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projected into the future, we find a considerable 
increase in extremes (such as intense precipitation) 
in comparison to the control period (1961-1990). 
While for the 2020s differences to the control are 
small, there is a considerable increase in extremes 
for the 2090s, in particular for a high temperature 
increase trajectory (SRES A2 scenario). For 
example, drought extremes in the Guadiana river 
basin and wet extremes in the Tisza river basin (two 
ADAM regional foci) will be significantly 
enhanced. Such risk analysis is hence important for 
local stakeholders and national/European authorities 
alike to raise awareness to exposures to current and 
future risks as well as to adapt more effective and 
adaptation measures. For instance, the information 
may inform a more equitable and risk-based 
allocation of the EU solidarity fund, which was set 
up in 2002 to provide financial aid to member states 
for post-disaster emergency measures. 
5.2 Assessing fiscal and economic 
disaster risks 
Building on the above task of mapping monetary 
risks to public and private assets for selected natural 
hazards over Europe, the 2nd research focus 
presented here estimates economic vulnerability of 
European households, businesses and governments 
to probabilistic disaster losses. The key question 
addressed is how those economic agents can absorb 
(or not) the monetary disaster losses and risks, 
which involves assessing their capacity to reduce 
risks before, provide relief and rebuild assets after 
an event.  
A stream of activity focuses on the fiscal 
consequences and the modelling undertaken 
involves incorporating financial disaster risk and 
potential financing gaps for funding these losses 
into macroeconomic projections in order to 
determine fiscal and economic consequences. 
Economic vulnerability can have serious 
repercussions on the national or regional economy 
and the population. If a government cannot replace 
or repair damaged infrastructure, for example, roads 
and hospitals, and fails to provide assistance to 
those in need after a disaster, there may be long-
term consequences. As one test case, flooding in the 
Upper Danube basin and the fiscal repercussions for 
Austria have been assessed. Based on 10,000 
disaster scenarios simulated, the analysis shows that 
the government may face serious fiscal problems to 
finance large loss events or recurring events 
affecting a large portion of infrastructure and 
requiring massive relief support to the affected 
population. The analysis demonstrates that disasters 
may have important fiscal consequences today and 
in a future climate with increasing flood losses, and 
that those effects can be accounted for in budget and 
other planning procedures. Other research in this 
line of work focuses on important economic sectors 
and their vulnerability and associated risks now and 
in the future. The final aim of this part of the 
ADAM project is to identify a set of extreme events 
and associated return periods that may be beyond 
the adaptive capacity of identified regions and 
sectors in Europe by placing unacceptable stress on 
the economic system. Importantly, all results 
derived in this thematic area of ADAM will be 
compiled in a digital compendium, which will be 
made available to the public via the internet and 
thus will provide a transparent, open-domain 
resource for informing interested and affected 
stakeholders on local, national and EU levels. 
6. Uncertainties surrounding 
adaptation17 
This section explores different concepts of 
uncertainties surrounding climate change and 
variability in the context of adaptation. It is argued 
that responses will depend on the range of 
uncertainty. More importantly, adaptive measures 
are best suited if they enable structural change while 
being sufficiently flexible to allow recalibration 
when uncertainties are reduced. Yet, the devil is in 
the detail. 
The issue of uncertainty pervades the scientific and 
policy literature on climate change. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), for example, has worked hard to develop 
guidelines for modelling, interpreting, and 
communicating uncertainty, in preparation for 
writing their Fourth Assessment Report, seeing 
these elements as a key cross-cutting element. There 
has been a great deal of literature examining how 
this uncertainty ought to influence decisions made 
with respect to climate change mitigation. Although 
the implications of uncertainty are at least as great, 
there has been much less examination of the effects 
of uncertainty for climate change to adaptation, 
probably because the issue of adaptation has 
surfaced more recently.  
There are four main sources of uncertainty that are 
relevant for adaptation planning, and distinguishing 
these is relevant to understanding the pace at which 
uncertainty will be resolved.  
• First, the level of uncertainty concerning the 
basic science of the climate system, and the 
responses of biological and social systems to 
changes in climate, is high. Continued scientific 
research may help to resolve some of this 
uncertainty, although it may also uncover 
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additional uncertainty, such as particular 
feedbacks. Over the last two decades, the 
second of these two forces has dominated, such 
that the estimated range of uncertainty has 
grown larger, although hopefully more accurate.  
• Second, predictions of the future state of the 
climate system are sensitive to uncertainties 
concerning the current state of the climate 
system. More complete measurement of current 
climate variables, as well as the use of more 
proxy records for the past climate state, may 
help to resolve some of this uncertainty. Cox 
and Stephenson (2007) suggest that uncertainty 
over initial conditions is most important for 
trying to make predictions about the state of the 
climate system over the next 20 years. In this 
case, inter-annual and multi-decadal variability 
dominates the climate signal, and it is current 
data limitations that give rise to uncertainty 
about these factors (Smith et al., 2007).  
• Third, the climate system will respond over time 
to future emissions, which in turn are influenced 
by long-term economic and technological 
development trends, and by policies that are 
specific responses to climate change. The 
former are captured to some extent by the range 
in the SRES emissions scenarios (although it is 
worth noting that the world is currently above 
the high end of the SRES range). Climate-
specific policies are not captured by any 
standard scenarios, although the range has some 
likely boundaries: from no significant mitigation 
policy at all, to policies that completely 
eliminate greenhouse gas emissions in the next 
few decades. This range of uncertainty, 
especially due to climate-specific actions, 
narrows only in response to actual events 
playing out, such as the signing of an 
international treaty, or the invention of a new 
technology. Together, these three factors 
account for a great deal of uncertainty about 
what climate impacts will occur, at what level, 
and in what place.  
• Fourth, there is a great deal of uncertainty about 
how adaptation policies will work, and indeed 
what policy measures can contribute to 
increasing adaptive capacity. Greater case study 
research may provide guidance on this, although 
such case studies would analyse the 
effectiveness attempts at actual adaptation 
planning, and these are only starting now. 
Hence, it will be some years before uncertainty 
concerning the effectiveness of adaptation 
policies becomes less.  
For adaptation, it is especially the timescales that 
are important, since some adaptations are to 
infrastructure with discrete lifetimes, such as 30 or 
40 years, while others will affect human settlement 
and activity patterns into the distant future. The 
spatial aspect is also important, because with few 
exceptions, adaptation will made at the local to 
national level. In comparison, for mitigation, it is 
the total range of uncertainty, rather than its 
temporal or spatial aspects, which is most important. 
This is because the effects of today’s mitigation 
decision will be felt for centuries, and globally. 
Irrespective, some adaptations can be made in 
response to observed changes, however others, 
especially those with longer time horizons, need to 
be anticipatory. Given the analytic difficulties 
associated with estimating the range of uncertainty, 
one response could be to adapt to the mean expected 
change. Another possibility could be to adopt a risk 
management framework, and to adapt to changes 
expected at a particular confidence level, such as 
99%. If, for example, the median warming estimate 
for the next 100 years is 4°C, and at the 99% 
confidence level it will be less than 7°C, then the 
risk management approach may be to adapt to the 
set of conditions that would occur given that 7°C 
future. This would minimize risk, but might also be 
quite wasteful, since it is unlikely that the full 7°C 
of warming will happen. The third – and most 
complicated – approach is to take a real options 
approach, which takes into account the 
irreversibility of action, and the rate at which 
uncertainty will be resolved over time. If uncertainty 
is expected to be resolved quickly, then it makes 
sense to postpone irreversible decisions until the 
uncertainty is resolved. While it is possible that 
some event could resolve a large piece of 
uncertainty – a breakthrough in solar technology 
that makes a zero emissions future suddenly certain 
– this is unlikely to be the case; more likely is that 
the uncertainty over events occurring more than 
about 40 years into the future will decrease 
somewhat over time, that there will be very little 
further decrease in uncertainty for events within that 
40 year window, and that the remaining uncertainty 
will be resolved at the last minute.  
In conclusion, uncertainty is thus not a good 
justification for postponing action (i.e. anticipatory 
adaptations with payoffs within that 40 year 
window) since the uncertainty will probably only be 
resolved too late to still engage in anticipation. 
However, uncertainty means making adaptations 
flexible, rather than irreversible, so that at the last 
minute they can easily be scaled up, or scaled back, 
as conditions dictate. How much flexibility to invest 
in needs to be resolved on a case-by-case basis, 
since depending on technological and social 
constraints it will come at very different costs. 
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Appendix 1. 
Illustrative matrix of EU policy area and the interaction with adaptation and 
mainstreaming  
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Key: * Some potential effect. ** Likely influence. *** Very important influence. 
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